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Abstract
Background: The alleged efficacy of pharmaceutical industry self-regulation has been used to repudiate increased
government oversight over promotional activity. European politicians and industry have cited Sweden as an excellent
example of self-regulation based on an ethical code. This paper considers antidepressant advertising in Sweden to uncover
the strengths and weaknesses of self-regulation.
Methodology: We analyzed all antidepressant advertisements in the Swedish Medical Journal, 1994–2003. The regulation of
these advertisements was analyzed using case reports from self-regulatory bodies. The authors independently reviewed this
material to investigate: (1) extent of violative advertising; (2) pattern of code breaches; (3) rate at which the system reacted
to violative advertising; (4) prevalence of and oversight over claims regarding antidepressant efficacy and disease causality,
and (5) costs for manufactures associated with violative advertising.
Principal Findings: Self-regulatory bodies identified numerous code breaches. Nonetheless, they failed to protect doctors
from unreliable information on antidepressants, since as many as 247 of 722 (34%) advertisements breached the industry
code. Self-regulatory bodies repeatedly failed to challenge inflated claims of antidepressant efficacy, lending evidence of lax
oversight. On average, 15 weeks elapsed between printing and censure of a wrongful claim, and in 25% of cases 47 weeks
or more elapsed. Industry paid roughly J108000 in fines for violative advertising, adding an estimated additional average
cost of 11% to each purchased violative advertisement, or amounting to as little as 0.009% of total antidepressant sales of
around J1.2 billion.
Conclusions: Lax oversight, combined with lags in the system and low fines for violations, may explain the Swedish system’s
failure to pressure companies into providing reliable antidepressants information. If these shortcomings prove to be
consistent across self-regulatory settings, and if appropriate measures are not taken to amend shortcomings, many
countries may want to reconsider the current balance between self-regulation, and legislative control with government
oversight.
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Introduction
Pharmaceutical companies advertise in medical journals to exert
influence over doctors’ prescribing habits [1]. Industry represen-
tatives assert that advertisements serve to educate doctors and
support rational prescribing practices [2–3]. However, a growing
number of international studies investigating the quality of claims
made in advertisements have reached the conclusion that claims,
especially in developing countries, are often incomplete, inflated
and sometimes downright misleading [4–14], which could result in
inappropriate prescribing practices [15]. For example, a study
investigating the accuracy of psychiatric medication advertise-
ments in high-impact medical journals in the United States found
that most claims in advertisements provided either no attainable
source (50%) or, when sources could be attained, contained
references that failed to support the claim (45%), leading the
authors to recommend increased regulation of such advertising
[11].
Given this research evidence pointing to the low quality of
medical journal drug advertisements as a global problem that
could endanger public health, the time is ripe to scrutinize the
promotion regulatory mechanisms that are in place to ensure
truthful and meaningful information on drugs [2], [16–19]. To this
end, this paper considers the workings of the Swedish regulatory
system, which has previously been singled out as particularly
efficient and trustworthy [16]. The importance of considering this
regulatory system was underscored more recently when European
politicians and industry representatives cited Sweden, in the
context of the new European Union patient information proposal,
as an excellent example of how industry ensured supposedly
reliable information on drugs over an extended period of time
[20]. Thus, the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry
and Associations (EFPIA) pointed to the positive experience with
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industry-based medicines information in Sweden and the United
Kingdom to argue that ‘‘self-regulation by the pharmaceutical
industry has proven to be highly efficient and valuable [21].’’
Similarly, the Pharmaceutical Forum, a high-level political
platform for European discussions on pharmaco-regulatory topics,
used the Swedish example, among other, to support their
recommendations that ‘‘self-regulatory mechanisms should be
setup within the public-private-partnership or collaborations’’ to
ensure reliable information to patients on diseases and treatment
options [22].
In Sweden, as in various other countries, including Australia,
Canada, Estonia, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Uganda, United
Kingdom, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, promotional activity target-
ing health professionals is governed by a voluntary code of practice
administered by the pharmaceutical industry’s own system of self-
regulation [16], [18], [23–25]. The Swedish industry code was
originally adopted in 1969 by representatives of the national and
international pharmaceutical industry, but has been repeatedly
revised [26]. The present code is essentially a modified version of
what was adopted by the EFPIA [27] and the International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations
(IFPMA) [28]. The section of the code relating to printed
promotional information targeting healthcare personnel comprises
20 articles [26]. These articles set out rules to ensure that printed
information includes ‘‘accurate, objective, meaningful and bal-
anced particulars dealing adequately with the favourable and
unfavourable properties of the drugs’’ (article 1). More specifically,
the code commands, for instance, that drug information should be
within the formulation of the Summary of Product Characteristics
(SPC) approved by the Swedish Medical Products Agency (MPA)
(article 2) and that information ‘‘must be truthful and may not
contain any presentation in words or pictures that directly or
indirectly – by implication, omission, distortion, exaggeration or
ambiguity – is intended to mislead’’ (article 4). Regarding
comparative claims, the code specifies that a study that is
contradicted by another/other studies may not be referred to
without reservation (article 11) and that ‘‘the facts which the
comparison is intended to clarify and the limitations inherent in
the comparison must be stated in such a way that the comparison
is not likely to mislead’’ (article 12).
In addition to being aligned with international industry codes of
practice, the Swedish industry code is in compliance with Swedish
and European Union marketing and pharmaceutical regulations.
In effect, the MPA, which is obliged by law to enforce these
regulations, has delegated this responsibility to the Swedish
Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (LIF). Since 1974,
two main self-regulatory bodies supervise company adherence to
the code: the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Information Examiner
(IGM) and the Information Practices Committee (NBL) (Fig. 1A).
The IGM is a scientifically qualified physician appointed by LIF,
dedicated to monitoring whether medicines information from
manufacturers complies with the industry code. The IGM acts
either in response to complaints filed by citizens, health
professionals or corporations or on personal initiative (i.e. in the
absence of complaints), but does not address complaints from
public authorities such as the MPA, which are sent to the NBL
committee. This committee consists of a chairperson and eleven
members: six represent industry, three the general public and two
are medical experts. LIF appoints the entire committee; however,
the representatives of the general public and the two medical
experts are appointed following consultation with an appropriate
body or authority representing consumers and the Swedish
Medical Association, respectively. The IGM can opt to refer
issues directly to the NBL without first examining them. The NBL
also addresses appeals of IGM decisions. Administrative fines
finance this self-regulatory system, including costs associated with
the IGM and NBL. In cases of violation, fines are paid by the
sanctioned company; however if a complaint brought by one
pharmaceutical company against another company is ruled
invalid, the complainant company pays the fee [26].
It has been suggested that extensive use of the complaints system
by the MPA, industry and health professionals is an indication that
the system is generally competent and unbiased [16]. Indeed, to
our knowledge the ability of the Swedish self-regulatory regime to
ensure reliable information on drugs has gone uncontested. In
contrast, in the United Kingdom, the 2005 House of Commons
Health Select Committee’s report on the influence of the
pharmaceutical industry concluded that ‘‘the examples cited to
us of breaches of advertising regulations, cover-up of negative
medicines information and provision of misleading information to
prescribers suggest that self-regulation is not working satisfactorily
[23].’’ Among other things, the report expressed concerns about
lax oversight over medicines promotion, substantial lags in the self-
regulatory system that allow firms to continue running misleading
advertisements for extended periods of time, and insufficient
sanctions that fail to deter companies from providing unreliable
information.
Motivated by such long-standing concerns, and by the citing of
Sweden as a role model for pharmaceutical industry drug
information provision and oversight, we investigated how the
Swedish regulatory system succeeded in ensuring reliable in-
formation on antidepressants in medical journal advertisements
between 1994 and 2003. This period saw an unprecedented
upsurge in the antidepressants market, coinciding with the product
launch of several SSRI and SNRI-type antidepressants. Pertinent
to this study’s rationale, 1994 to 2003 also comprises the period of
intense advertising for antidepressants, as patents for major brands
expired towards the end of the period, strongly reducing the
incentive to invest in drug promotion after this [29]. Here, we
present data suggesting that self-regulation in Sweden largely
failed to pressure companies into providing reliable information on
antidepressants in medical journal advertisements.
Methods
Study Overview
We used antidepressant advertisements printed in the Swedish
Medical Journal to investigate the workings of the Swedish self-
regulatory system of medicines promotion.
1. All antidepressant advertisements in the journal between 1994
and 2003 were collected together with basic information such
as date of printing.
2. Collected advertisements were coded into types according to
predefined criteria (e.g. professing product efficacy in the
treatment of depression, professing monoamine theories).
3. Case reports from the IGM/NBL were reviewed to identify
code breaches involving antidepressant advertising between
1994 and 2003.
Information obtained from these sources were used to:
a) Calculate the number of violative antidepressant advertise-
ments over the period.
b) Investigate the pattern of article breaches found by the IGM/
NBL.
c) Investigate the prevalence of, and oversight on the part of the
IGM/NBL over, two types of claims: exaggerated statements
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of efficacy and claims of disease causality related to brain
monoamine disturbances.
d) Study the rate at which the self-regulatory system reacted to
violative antidepressant advertising.
e) Investigate the economic costs for drug manufacturers
associated with purchasing violative antidepressant advertise-
ments, including the magnitude of the administrative fines in
relation to the cost of buying an advertisement.
Antidepressant Advertisements in the Swedish Medical
Journal
The Swedish Medical Association has published the Swedish
Medical Journal (La¨kartidningen) weekly since 1904. It is the
official organ of the association and the only journal in Swedish
indexed in Medline. The Swedish Medical Journal’s current
circulation is 40 900, and readers include 74% of the country’s
around 35 000 physicians, making it Sweden’s premier medical
journal [30].
We searched all journal issues dating from January 1994
through December 2003 to gather unique antidepressant adver-
tisements, i.e. advertisements of a particular kind with respect to
content [11]. Since each unique advertisement usually appears
many times, we also counted the times each unique advertisement
was printed. The date of printing of each advertisement was
recorded for subsequent calculations of the time between date of
original printing and date of ruling on a wrongful claim (see
below). Moreover, for subsequent cost calculations, we coded
advertisements according to the standard rate categories available
to advertisers that distinguish between advertisements on the basis
of color and dimensions as well as the journal page on which they
appear (e.g. [31]). Data were retrieved and coded independently
by the two authors. In cases of discrepancy between authors’
assessments, a consensus decision was reached following a joint
retrieval and coding of the data.
IGM/NBL Cases
To identify reported code breaches we reviewed reports of cases
considered by the IGM or NBL that are publically accessible in
a database managed by LIF [32]. Such reports typically include
a summary of specific charges, a response from the offending
company, comments from the IGM/NBL, the article(s) of the code
that have been breached, imposed economic sanctions, date of
ruling, last date of allowed dissemination of a claim (normally 2–3
weeks from date of ruling) and, when relevant, a scanned copy of
an offending advertisement. Information is not typically provided,
however, about where offending advertisements were printed. The
database can be searched using the Anatomical Therapeutic
Chemical (ATC) code of a drug or drug class to retrieve relevant
case reports. In cases where the IGM/NBL identified breaches
involving antidepressants promotion (ATC code N06A) between
1994 and 2003 we assessed whether these involved one or more
advertisements in our sample. For this, we used the information on
specific charges and the scanned copy of an offending advertise-
Figure 1. Flow through the Swedish complaints system for medicines promotion. (A) Outline of the Swedish self-regulatory system. The
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Information Examiner (IGM) monitors industry promotional material for potential code breaches. The IGM also handles
complaints from health professionals (HP), pharmaceutical companies and the general public. Offending companies are sanctioned by the IGM.
Besides handling appeals of IGM decisions, the Information Practices Committee (NBL) considers complaints from public authorities, such as the
Medical Products Agency (MPA), and sanctions code breaches. (B) Overview of the flow of cases concerning antidepressant advertising in the Swedish
Medical Journal in 1994–2003 including number of cases instigated by various actors. Of the 24 cases considered by the IGM/NBL, 23 were found to
be in violation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062609.g001
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ment enclosed in the case reports. In this way, we coded all
advertisements into violative or non-violative. For violative
advertisements, we also recorded the violated articles of the code
as specified in the case report. Again, we retrieved and coded the
data independently, and in cases of discrepancy we reached
a consensus decision following a joint retrieval and coding of the
data. We also reviewed the case reports for evidence of repeat
violations, i.e. similar violative claims for the same drug in more
the one case report.
Prevalence of and Oversight Over Claims Regarding
Antidepressant Efficacy and Disease Causality
To evaluate the strength of regulatory oversight, we considered
two classes of promotional claims that have been widely criticized:
(1) claims pertaining to drug efficacy in the treatment of
depression, and (2) claims pertaining to the biological under-
pinnings of depression. With respect to claims about drug efficacy,
we considered two types of claims: general claims about antidepres-
sant efficacy that did not make direct product comparisons, and
comparative claims that did. All advertisements containing such
claims were identified and compared to retrieved case reports to
identify breaches uncovered by the IGM/NBL related to these
claims.
According to the Swedish MPA, the percentage of responders
(defined as .50% reduction of the baseline Hamilton Depression
Scale score) in submitted studies for product approval of
antidepressants varied between 13.6% and 67.9% (average 48%)
for active drugs, while the corresponding rate for placebo was
between 7.5% and 55.4% (average 32%) [33]. Claims of response
rates of 70% or more are thus inconsistent with the submitted data
on which product approval was based. Nor are such claims
consistent with similar meta-analyses [34–36]. For this reason, we
considered claims of response rates of 70% or more to be
misleading. We assessed all advertisements for such claims and
investigated the IGM/NBL case reports to assess whether the
IGM/NBL treated them as code violations. We did not assess
whether advertisements mentioned the magnitude of the placebo
response because reporting of placebo data is not required under
LIF’s current interpretation of the code [37].
As underscored by numerous scholars, professing monoamine
theories of depression (the idea that depression is caused by low
levels – or ‘‘chemical imbalances’’ – of monoamines such as
serotonin and noradrenaline) has been a centerpiece of the
industry strategy to expand markets for monoamine-boosting
antidepressants [38–41]. Importantly, however, monoamine the-
ories, which gained popularity in the mid-1960s, have been widely
criticized in light of scientific evidence [38–44]. We assessed
whether advertisements in our sample professed monoamine
theories and whether the IGM/NBL considered this a code
violation. Any antidepressant advertisement claiming that de-
pression was related to monoamine imbalances or low neuro-
transmitter levels was coded as professing monoamine theories.
Swiftness of the Self-regulatory System
The rate at which the system reacted to violative antidepressant
advertising was measured first by calculating the ‘‘reaction time’’
for each examined IGM/NBL case, defined as the time between
date of original printing and date of ruling on a wrongful claim (in
weeks), and second by calculating the total number of antidepres-
sant advertisements in violation between these dates per IGM/
NBL case. While the former measures the time during which
companies are allowed to run misleading advertisements prior to
the IGM/NBL ruling, the latter measures the number of
misleading advertisements that are allowed in print. It is important
to bear in mind that the reaction time represents the sum of the
elapsed time between (1) the printing and reporting dates, and (2)
the reporting and ruling dates. Because case reports normally do
not specify reporting dates, we could not evaluate (1) or (2);
however, according to the IGM, in most cases the time between
reporting and ruling is less than a month [45]. To investigate if any
shifts in the system’s rate of response had occurred over the ten-
year period, reaction times and the number of advertisements per
IGM/NBL case were plotted against date of ruling. We also
investigated differences in these variables between, on one side,
cases initiated via active monitoring of promotional material by
the IGM and, on the other side, cases initiated after voluntary
complaints from industry, health professionals, or the MPA.
Additionally, we assessed whether drug companies complied with
the IGM/NBL decision by determining, for each examined IGM/
NBL case, the elapsed time between the last date of allowed
dissemination of a claim, as specified by the IGM/NBL case
report, and the last date of printing of a claim, as well as the
number of advertisements printed between these dates.
Cost Calculations
The economic cost of publishing violative antidepressant
advertisements was calculated by considering the magnitude of
the administrative fines in relation to antidepressant sales in
Sweden. Data on administrative fines were obtained from
IGM/NBL case reports [32]. Data on antidepressant sales prior
to 1999 were acquired from [46] and after 1999 from [47].
Another way of gauging the economic cost of publishing
misleading advertisements is to consider the magnitude of the
administrative fines in relation to the cost of buying an
advertisement. To this end, we estimated the additional average
cost added by administrative fines to each purchased violative
antidepressant advertisement. In a first step, we estimated the cost
of antidepressant advertising using advertising rates published in
the Swedish Medical Journal. In 1997, for example, a regular one-
page color advertisement cost roughly J3100. We were unable to
establish advertising rates for every year, and when queried, the
journal failed to provide us with the missing data. For missing
years, we estimated rates based on overall yearly rate increments.
To calculate the cost of violative antidepressant advertising, we
used these rate estimates together with the coded information on
the rate category of each violative advertisement (see above). In
a second step, we divided total administrative fines by the total cost
of violative antidepressant advertising.
Finally, we investigated whether any shifts in additional
average costs had occurred over the ten-year period. For IGM/
NBL cases involving advertisements printed over numerous
years, administrative fines were allocated between years
according to the proportion of advertisements printed each
year, e.g. if equal number of advertisements were printed in
2000 and 2001, the fine was divided equally between years. In
all calculations, exchange rates available from the Swedish
Riksbank [48] were used to convert from Swedish kronor to
euro (EUR) on an annual basis.
Statistics
Shifts in variables over the ten-year period were tested using
linear regression. Differences between groups were analyzed by
non-parametric Mann–Whitney test. Statistical analyses were
performed using GraphPad Prism 5.0 (Graphpad software, La
Jolla, CA, USA).
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Results
Misleading Antidepressants Advertising in the Swedish
Medical Journal
Antidepressant sales in Sweden increased 3.4 fold between 1994
and 2003, reaching J158 million in 2002, but subsequently started
falling (Fig. 2A). Over the same period, a total of 722
advertisements for antidepressants were published in the Swedish
Medical Journal, corresponding to 124 unique advertisements for
13 different products (Table 1). The number of advertisements
peaked in 1998 when 107 advertisements were published (Fig. 2A).
Declining antidepressant spending and advertising were not
associated with fewer prescriptions for antidepressants (Fig. 2B),
but instead coincided with price cuts due to major patent expiries,
including patents for Fontex (fluoxetine), Cipramil (citalopram)
and Seroxat (paroxetine) [29].
During this ten-year period, the IGM processed 549 complaints,
22 (or 4%) of which were relevant to antidepressant advertise-
ments in the Swedish Medical Journal. The IGM initiated 12 of
these, competing companies seven, and health professionals three
(all complaints jointly submitted by the same two health
professionals) (Fig. 1B). The IGM ruled against the accused
company in all but one case. Similarly, between 1994 and 2003,
the NBL received 258 complaints, nine (3%) of which applied to
antidepressant advertisements in the journal. The MPA initiated
two complaints, one of which was found to breach the industry
code. The remaining seven were appeals of IGM decisions. The
NBL overruled one IGM decision on one occasion, to the
disadvantage of the offending company. Thus, when considered
together, the IGM and NBL processed 24 cases relevant to
antidepressant advertisements in the journal, 23 (96%) of which
were found to be in violation (see Table S1 for listing of cases).
From the above overview, it is tempting to conclude that 23 of
124 (19%) unique antidepressant advertisements breached the
code according to IGM/NBL standards. This, however, would be
a gross underestimate because several rulings apply to more than
one unique advertisement (since in many instances the same claim
can be found in more than one unique advertisement) (Table S1).
When all advertisements directly named in the rulings and other
advertisements for the same product and that included the same
violative materials are considered, a total of 47 rather than 23
unique advertisements breached the code, reflecting more than
one third (38%) of all unique advertisements (Table 1). Calculated
based on total number of advertisements, this translates to 247 of
722 (34%) antidepressant advertisements. The number of violative
antidepressant advertisements peaked in 1998 when 46 violative
advertisements were printed, corresponding to 43% of all
antidepressant advertisements that year (minimum 11% in 2000;
maximum 83% in 1994) (Fig. 2C).
Breaches Found by the IGM/NBL
Table 2 summarizes the article violations uncovered by the
IGM/NBL (see Table S2 for not violated articles relevant to
medical journal advertising). Notably, the total number of article
breaches (n = 402) is much larger than the total number of
violative advertisements (n = 247). This is because most advertise-
ments violated more than one article (Table S1). Remarkably, 40
of 124 (32%) unique advertisements, or 201 of 722 (28%) total
advertisements, breached article 4, which mandates that medicines
information must be truthful and not intended to mislead.
Evidence of Lax Oversight
The data presented above could be taken to suggest that while
the Swedish regulatory system has failed to protect doctors from
unreliable information on antidepressants, it has simultaneously
been quite effective at identifying unreliable antidepressant
advertisements. We probed the strength of the Swedish system
by assessing general claims and comparative claims about antidepressant
efficacy in advertisements. As summarized in Table 3, a total of 16
Figure 2. Antidepressant sales in Sweden and advertising
dynamics in the Swedish Medical Journal. (A) Graphs show
antidepressant sales (in EUR million) (dotted line) in Sweden in 1991–
2011 and total antidepressant advertisements (red unbroken line) in the
Swedish Medical Journal in 1994–2003. Spending on antidepressants
rose steeply between 1993 and 1996, as well as between 1999 and
2001, but subsequently plateaued and started falling, coinciding with
a drop in antidepressant advertising. (B) Declining antidepressant
spending (dotted line) and advertising did not coincide with a drop in
prescriptions (unbroken line), but instead coincided with price cuts due
to major patent expiries. (C) Graphs show total (red line) and violative
(black line) antidepressant advertising in the Swedish Medical Journal in
1994–2003.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062609.g002
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(13%) and 28 (23%) of 124 unique advertisements, or 136 (19%)
and 154 (21%) of 722 total advertisements, fell into the first and
second groups, respectively. All efficacy claims were accompanied
by references to articles, posters or conference presentations.
While general efficacy claims completely eschewed attention from the
IGM/NBL, comparative efficacy claims were found to breach the code
on numerous occasions (i.e. 54% of unique comparative efficacy claims
were found to breach the code), which may indicate that the
regulatory system is generally more alert to claims that imply
a comparison between products.
Notably, the IGM/NBL repeatedly allowed claims about
response rates of 70–90% to go unnoticed. In fact, all general
efficacy claims were of 75% or more. A single unique advertisement
containing comparative efficacy claims reported response rates: 76%
and 81% for sertraline and citalopram, respectively. While
individual studies may support such claims, they are not supported
by the data submitted by companies to the Swedish MPA for
marketing authorization [33]. Basing efficacy claims on individual
studies, rather than the overall bulk of available data, must be
considered a code violation, especially of articles 8 and 11 (see
Table 2), illustrating lax oversight by the IGM/NBL.
Oversight of Advertisements Professing Monoamine
Theories
Monoamine theories have been criticized as inconsistent with
the scientific evidence [38–44]. We identified 12 of 124 (10%)
unique advertisements, or 62 of 722 (9%) total advertisements, that
professed monoamine theories (Table 3). In no case did the IGM/
NBL consider the dissemination of monoamine theories to be in
violation of the code.
Swiftness of the Self-regulatory System
Strikingly, we found considerable variation in reaction times, i.e.
the time between printing and ruling on a wrongful claim (Fig. 3A).
Specifically, while median reaction time was 15 weeks, in 25% of
cases reaction time was 47 weeks or more. Similarly, while the
median number of printed advertisements per IGM/NBL case
was seven, in 25% of cases 15 or more advertisements had been
allowed in print prior to the IGM/NBL ruling (Fig. 3B). There was
a small but significant trend towards longer reaction times over the
studied period (p = 0.04). This trend may be related to the high
proportion of cases initiated via active monitoring of promotional
material by the IGM in the first half of the period and, conversely,
the high proportion of cases initiated after voluntary complaints
from industry, health professionals or the MPA in the second half
of the period. Consistent with this, cases initiated by the IGM had
shorter reaction times than cases initiated following voluntary
complaints (p = 0.007) (Fig. 3C). For number of printed advertise-
ments per IGM/NBL case between printing and ruling dates,
similar but non-significant trends were observed (Fig. 3B and 3D).
In sum, the evidence in this study indicates that while self-
regulatory bodies may act promptly to investigate possible
breaches, the system is nevertheless hampered by significant lags
that allow firms to continue running violative advertisements for
extended periods of time.
Decisions Ignored and Repeat Violations
We found that, as requested by the IGM/NBL, drug companies
often stopped disseminating violative antidepressant advertise-
ments within 2–3 weeks of the first ruling. However, in three of the
23 cases, the companies ignored the IGM/NBL request (Table
S1). In these cases, companies continued running advertisements
for nine, 13 and 88 weeks, respectively, during which they printed
five, four and 11 advertisements, respectively. This happened
without additional reprimands from the IGM/NBL, lending
further evidence of lax oversight. The most notable case (88
weeks; 11 advertisements) involved advertisements for Cipramil
(citalopram) professing that the drug was the ‘‘most selective
serotonin uptake inhibitor’’; a statement clearly intended to lead
the reader into wrongly believing that this had clinical relevance,
both the IGM and NBL noted.
In regards to repeat violations – i.e. similar violative claims for
the same drug in more than one case report – we found a single
example of this (Table S1). In that case, the IGM ruled against the
company twice, in 2002 and then again in 2003, for professing
Table 1. Number of printed and violative antidepressant advertisements in the Swedish Medical Journal 1994–2003.
Antidepressant ads Ads in violation of code
Product Company
Unique ads
(n=124)
Total ads
(n=722)
Unique ads
(n=47) Total ads (n =247)
Citalopram (Cipramil) Lundbeck 25 (20.2%) 171 (23.7%) 12 (25.5%) 88 (35.6%)
Escitalopram (Cipralex) Lundbeck 10 (8.1%) 42 (5.8%) 5 (10.6%) 21 (8.5%)
Fluoxetine (Fontex) Eli Lilly 16 (12.9%) 71 (9.8%) 6 (12.8%) 8 (3.2%)
Fluoxetine (Fluoxetine Selena) Selena 1 (0.8%) 14 (1.9%) 0 0
Fluoxetine (Seroscand Fluoxetine) Seroscand 2 (1.6%) 15 (2.1%) 0 0
Fluvoxamine (Fevarin) Meda/Solvay 2 (1.6%) 3 (0.4%) 1 (2.1%) 1 (0.4%)
Mirtazapine (Remeron) Organon 10 (8.1%) 70 (9.7%) 3 (6.4%) 44 (17.8%)
Moclobemide (Aurorix) Roche 4 (3.2%) 21 (2.9%) 0 0
Nefazodon (Nefadar) Bristol-Myers Squibb 1 (0.8%) 2 (0.3%) 0 0
Paroxetine (Seroxat) Novo Nordisk/
SmithKleinB
25 (20.2%) 73 (10.1%) 10 (21.3%) 21 (8.5%)
Reboxetine (Edronax) Pharmacia & Upjohn 1 (0.8%) 5 (0.7%) 0 0
Sertraline (Zoloft) Pfizer 10 (8.1%) 149 (20.6%) 2 (4.3%) 28 (11.3%)
Venlafaxine (Effexor) Wyeth 17 (13.7%) 86 (11.9%) 8 (17.0%) 36 (14.6%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062609.t001
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almost identical unsubstantiated claims about the comparative
efficacy of their product Cipralex (escitalopram).
Low Fines
The IGM/NBL regularly impose economic sanctions on
companies and in 1994–2003 offenders collectively paid out
J108000 in administrative fines to LIF for unethical antidepres-
sant advertisements (Table S1). Yet the high rate of code breaches
identified in this study indicates that sanctions failed to deter
companies from publishing misleading antidepressant advertise-
ments. One reason for this failure could be that fines are too low in
relation to revenues generated by such misleading drug promotion
[49]. Between 1994 and 2003, antidepressant sales in Sweden
generated revenue of about J1.2 billion (Fig. 2A). In other words,
administrative fines for unethical antidepressant advertisements
corresponded to 0.009% of total antidepressant spending. Since
1994, standard fines have been ratcheted up from J1100 to
today’s differentiated rates of J4500, J10200, and J15800 for
simple, normal and serious offences, respectively (higher fines may
be imposed for noncompliance with a ruling). However, the
number of IGM/NBL rulings against offenders has not declined in
response to the increased fines (Fig. S1), indicating that thus far
this tactic has had little effect on corporate behavior.
We next considered the magnitude of the administrative fines in
relation to the cost of buying an advertisement (Fig. 4). Between
Table 2. Frequency and examples of code breaches found by the IGM or NBL in antidepressant advertisements in the Swedish
Medical Journal in 1994–2003.
Art Type of breach
Specification (Adapted from the LIF
code of ethics)
Cases1
(n =23)
Unique
ads2
(n=124)
Total ads2
(n =722) Examples3
1 Objectivity Information must include accurate,
objective, meaningful and balanced
particulars.
3 (13.0%4) 6 (4.8%4) 37 (5.1%4) Seroxat (paroxetine) was presented as ‘‘the
natural choice’’ (IGM B030/95).
2 Objectivity The Summary of Product Characteristics
adopted for a drug constitutes the
factual basis for information about
the drug.
3 (13.0%) 9 (7.3%) 24 (3.3%) Seroxat ad referred to disorders other than
depression - including Generalized Anxiety
Disorder for which the drug lacked approval (NBL
542/00).
3 Objectivity Information must conform to good
practice and good taste.
1 (4.3%) 2 (1.6%) 3 (0.4%) The expression ‘‘imbalanced depression patient’’
in a Fontex (fluoxetine) ad was found distasteful
(IGM B048/95).
4 Truthful
presentation
Drug information must be truthful and
may not contain any presentation in
words or pictures that directly or
indirectly – by implication, omission,
distortion, exaggeration or ambiguity – is
intended to mislead.
20 (87.0%) 40 (32.3%) 201 (27.8%) Ad professed that Cipramil (citalopram) was the
‘‘most selective serotonin uptake inhibitor’’. IGM
and NBL noted that this statement was clearly
intended to lead the reader into wrongly
believing that this had clinical relevance (NBL 422/
95).
8 Documentation and
references
Information as to the quality and
efficacy of a drug shall be capable of
substantiation by means of
documentation…of a high
scientific standard.
3 (13.0%) 6 (4.8%) 21 (2.9%) Ad claimed that Fontex was ‘‘the most
documented SSRI in the world’’ with a reference
to ‘‘data on file’’. When queried regarding that
reference, the company responded that this
referred to the evolving bulk of clinical literature
on SSRIs (IGM B048/95).
10 Documentation and
references
Information that contains quotations,
numerical data, etc., taken from a
scientific study or deals with a
comparison between drugs that is
based on such a study, must
clearly contain information about
relevant sources and references to the
documentation.
1 (4.3%) 4 (3.2%) 23 (3.2%) An abstract cited to support the claim that Effexor
(venlafaxine) was superior to fluoxetine did not
contain a comparison between substances (IGM
W119/98).
11 Documentation and
references
Documentation must be cited in a balanced
and fair way.
7 (30.4%) 14 (11.3%) 60 (8.3%) A study cited to support the claim that Effexor
was superior to paroxetine reported that although
Effexor beat paroxetine, neither drug was better
than placebo (IGM W119/98).
12 Comparisons Drug information that includes
comparisons between effects, active
ingredients, costs of treatment, etc., must
be presented in such a way that the
comparison as a whole is fair.
4 (17.4%) 6 (4.8%) 32 (4.4%) A study cited to support the claim that Cipralex
(escitalopram) had an earlier onset of action than
Cipramil did not support this claim (NBL 626/02).
16–20 Specific rules of
conduct
E.g. drug information should cite a drug’s
active ingredient, dosage form and any
required warnings.
1 (4.3%) 1 (0.8%) 1 (0.1%) Ad for Seroxal did not contain the updated
catalogue text, and this was not yet available to
doctors (IGM B032/95).
See Table S2 for complete list of relevant articles.
1Refers to IGM/NBL cases. Note that some cases revealed more than one type of article breach: see Table S1.
2A few ads had contents ruled in violation in multiple cases.
3Case numbers in the IGM/NBL database are indicated.
4Percentage in cell of total, e.g. 13% of IGM/NBL cases, 4.8% of unique ads, and 5.1% of total ads breached article 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062609.t002
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1994 and 2003, companies purchased antidepressant advertise-
ments in the Swedish Medical Journal for approximately J2.7
million, of which violative advertisements (according to IGM/
NBL standards) accounted for roughly J0.94 million. This means
that administrative fines added an additional average cost of 11%
to each purchased violative antidepressant advertisement in the
journal. There was no significant shift in the additional average
cost over the studied period (p = 0.11).
Discussion
Antidepressants comprise one of the most prescribed drug
classes in the world [50–51]. Our analysis supports the contention
that the explosion of the antidepressant market since the 1990s was
associated with major promotional activity. Importantly, this study
suggests that this promotional activity was to a significant extent
unethical since more than every third antidepressant advertise-
ment in our sample was unacceptable according to industry
standards. Specifically, many advertisements failed to truthfully
present the product. Untruthful medicines information may bias
health professionals, steering them away from scientifically and
economically sound prescribing practices, and thereby represent
a potential danger to public health and state finances [15].
While numerous studies have addressed the low quality of
medicines advertisements in medical journals, few have investi-
gated bias in promotional regulatory regimes [9]. This study
confirms prior suspicions of lax oversight on the part of self-
regulatory bodies [9], [19], [23]. Thus, Swedish self-regulatory
bodies, the IGM and NBL, previously heralded as exemplary [16],
permitted exaggerated statements about antidepressant efficacy
that, although occasionally supported by individual studies, are
inconsistent with the data submitted to the Swedish MPA for
marketing authorization [33]. The problem of relying on a few
individual studies to substantiate claims about drug efficacy is
Table 3. Statements in antidepressant advertisements advancing general or comparative efficacy in depression treatment, or
professing monoamine theories.
Category Examples: translated quotes
Unique ads
(n=124) Total ads (n =722)
General efficacy claims 16/01 (12.9%2/0%3)
136/01 (18.8%2/
0%3)
After only two weeks, 75% had a satisfactory effect. In the rest the dose was increased to
2675 mg/day. Irrespective of dose 82% of all patients were classified as responders on the
HAM-D scale after six weeks (Effexor (venlafaxine) ad).
It is evident from the literature that 60–85% of patients with major depression respond to
antidepressant therapy. When treatment fails, it is often considered to be due to too low
a dosage (Fontex (fluoxetine) ad).
Two large Swedish studies show that: 9 of 10 people with depression are cured with Zoloft
[sertraline]; 8 of 10 are cured with Zoloft. (Cured $50% reduction of points in the MADRS-
scale).
Comparative efficacy
claims
28/15 (22.6%/53.6%) 154/107 (21.3%/69.5%)
In another, recently presented, placebo-controlled trail citalopram was compared with
sertraline. The response to treatment was significantly better in the Cipramil group than in
the sertraline group at one or more time points according to HAMD, MADRS and CGI scales.
Effexor XR gives 30% more symptom-free patients compared with SSRI (Fluoxetine,
Paroxetine and Fluvoxamine) (10% higher remission rates compared with SSRI).
The corresponding figures for all patients included in the study was 76% for the sertaline
group and 81% for the Cipramil patients (Cipramil [citalopram] ad).
Significantly more patents are restored with Cipralex [escitalopram] than with
Cipramil…Sustained remission is achieved a week earlier with Cipralex that with Effexor XR
(IGM W502/03).4
Already within a week the difference was significant compared with paroxetine, within two
weeks with citalopram and within three weeks with fluoxetine (Remeron (mirtazapine) ad) (IGM
W448/02).4
Monoamine theories 12/0 (9.7%/0%) 62/0 (8.6%/0%)
Cipramil normalizes (with its high 5HT selectivity) perturbations in the serotonergic system
without simultaneously influencing other neurotransmitter systems.
Which of your patients suffer from serotonin deficiency and which from noradrenalin
[deficiency]? That question is difficult to answer before you see the effect of the
antidepressant medication that is administrated (Effexor ad).
Aurorix [moclobemide] restores the balance of the neurotransmitters serotonin and
noradrenaline.
1Number of ads containing claims or theories/number of ads found in breach by the IGM/NBL for this, e.g. 16 unique ads professed general efficacy claims; zero were
found to be in violation for this.
2Percentage of ads containing claims or theories of total, e.g. 12.9% of 124 unique advertisements professed general efficacy claims.
3Percentage of ads found in breach by the IGM/NBL of ads containing claims or theories, e.g. 16 unique ads professed general efficacy claims; zero percent were found
to be in violation for this.
4Italicized statements were found to breach the code by the IGM/NBL. Case number in the IGM/NBL database is indicated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062609.t003
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underscored by studies showing selective publishing and selective
reporting of clinical trials [34], [52]. In the past, the IGM/NBL
have ruled against companies for making unjustified claims based
on individual studies. Frequently, the IGM/NBL have referred to
article 11 (e.g. rulings W519/03, W644/04 and W734/05),
including 11.1 ‘‘the results of a study, which are contradicted by
another study, may not be cited without reservation and that
results that have been refuted must not be used’’ and 11.2: ‘‘a
study may not be cited in such a way that it could convey an
incorrect or misleading impression of the nature, scope, imple-
mentation or importance of the study’’ [26]. For example, in
ruling W519/03 regarding marketing of a cyclooxygenase-2
(COX-2) inhibitor, an anti-inflammatory drug, the IGM sanc-
tioned the offending company for disseminating material that used
a single study to support a claim of superior comparative efficacy
due to contradictory reports in the literature. This is pertinent to
the present discussion because it suggests that the main problem is
code enforcement, rather than the code itself or its interpretation.
We have also assessed oversight of adverts professing mono-
amine theories – a disease explanation criticized by many as
incongruent with the scientific literature on depression [38–44],
yet no IGM/NBL actions were found related to this issue. If such
claims are not currently considered violations, we would argue that
the IGM/NBL should revisit the evidence and consider whether
these claims should be judged as misleading. The IGM/NBL have
on numerous occasions ruled against companies for making claims
inconsistent with the scientific evidence. Frequently, companies
have been referred to articles 4 and/or 7, which mandate that
drug information must be truthful and up-to-date, respectively
(e.g. rulings W60/98, W448/02 and W850/06). Thus, in ruling
W60/98 the IGM used the two articles to rule against a company
Figure 3. Lags in the system allowed for extended and substantial exposure to unethical antidepressant advertising. The instigator of
each IGM/NBL case is indicated; HP (health professionals), MPA (Medical Products Agency). (A) Scatter plot of reaction times (i.e. the elapsed time
between original publication date and date of ruling against wrongful claims) among IGM/NBL cases concerning antidepressant advertising in the
Swedish Medical Journal in 1994–2003. Linear regression analysis shows that reaction times increased over the ten-year period (p = 0.041; b=6.9
weeks/year; n = 23). (B) Scatter plot of the total number of violative advertisements in the Swedish Medical Journal per IGM/NBL case prior to date of
ruling. Linear regression analysis shows that there was a borderline significant increase in the number of advertisements allowed in print over the
period (p = 0.063; b= 1.4 ads/year; n = 23). (C) Reaction times and (D) number of violative advertisements among cases instigated by the IGM (i.e. via
active monitoring of promotional material) and non-IGM (i.e. following voluntary complaints from industry, HP or the MPA), respectively. The median
of each group is indicated by the bar. Differences between groups were analyzed with two-tailed Mann-Whitney test. There was a significant
difference in reaction time between IGM and non-IGM cases (p = 0.007) (in C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062609.g003
Figure 4. Administrative fines are low in relation to the costs of
purchasing advertisements in the Swedish Medical Journal.
Graphs show estimated purchasing costs for unethical antidepressant
advertisements (unbroken line), according to IGM/NBL standards, in the
Swedish Medical Journal in 1994–2003 and the administrative fines for
offending companies (dotted line) over the same period (in EUR
million).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062609.g004
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for making claims about the protective effect of their typhoid
vaccine that diverged from current evidence. Similarly to the
IGM/NBL, the MPA and the European Medicines Agency have
for a long time remained silent about the dissemination of
monoamine theories to support the use of monoamine boosting
antidepressants. However, the MPA recently responded to a letter
in the Swedish Medical Journal from one of the authors of this
paper, which criticized statements professing monoamine theories
in Patient Information Leaflets [53], by concluding that such
statements ‘‘are too categorical and simplistic, and that it would be
desirable to have a more balanced description [of the etiology of
depression]’’ [54]. Notably, as early as 2003 the Irish medicines
agency prohibited drug companies from professing monoamine
theories in Patient Information Leaflets [55].
This study also provides evidence of two further shortcomings
that compromise the system’s ability to pressure companies into
truthfully presenting their products: lags in the system and low
fines. For example, regarding lags in the system, we found that in
25% of cases at least 47 weeks or more elapsed between the
printing and censure of a wrongful claim. Furthermore, in three of
23 cases companies failed to comply with the obligation to stop
disseminating violative material. The finding of significant lags is
in accordance with the regulatory delays reported by United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its assessment of the
effectiveness of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
halting the dissemination of violative direct-to-consumer adver-
tisements [56]. Specifically, in the 19 cases from 2004 and 2005
reviewed by the GAO there was an average delay of eight months
between the printing and censure of a wrongful claim. Lags in
regulatory systems are clearly unacceptable since they allow plenty
of time for misleading advertisements to bias prescribing practices.
Inappropriately low fines represent yet another area of major
concern. Strikingly, we found that fines corresponded to as little as
0.009% of total antidepressant spending over the period, and that
they added an estimated additional average cost of 11% to each
purchased violative advertisement in our sample with no evidence
of change over time. Arguably, such fines may merely be accepted
as the ‘‘cost of doing business’’ and do not serve as a significant
deterrent for companies with sales in the billions. Presently, fines
are calculated based on the cost of administering the self-
regulatory system. The fact that delinquent corporations pay
administrative fines aimed at keeping the self-regulatory system
afloat, rather than providing compensation for damages caused by
– and profits generated as a result of – misleading drug promotion
represents a major weakness in the Swedish regulatory system.
As evident from this discussion, several modifications must be
made to the existing system to improve performance. For example,
stricter enforcement of the code is needed, especially to ensure that
professed information about drug efficacy is based on the
aggregate of available data rather than on selected individual
studies. Related to this, self-regulatory bodies must ensure that
companies comply with their rulings. In terms of deterring
companies from producing misleading information, initiating pre-
vetting of promotional information by an expert body represents
one possible preventive strategy; however, as the Canadian
experience with pre-screening of journal advertisements by
a Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board demonstrates,
standards need also to be sufficiently rigorous and expert bodies
adequately funded to prevent misleading claims [57]. Compulsory
publishing of corrective statements in the same size, placement
and over the same time period as the original advertisements may
also serve as a significant deterrent for companies. Most
importantly, however, treating dissemination of misleading in-
formation as a criminal offence under which offending corpora-
tions pay damages rather than standard administrative fines is
likely to incentivize corporate adherence to the code.
Moreover, if the system is to function efficiently, health
professionals and public authorities must take greater responsibil-
ity for reporting potential breaches. Regarding public authorities,
in the present case the MPA obviously failed to report
inconsistencies between claims of response rates of 75–90% and
the considerably more moderate effects evident from the data on
which they based marketing authorization. Regarding health
professionals, the current trend in Sweden is toward less reporting
of breaches [58]. The failure of health professionals to report
breaches in the case of antidepressant promotion is illustrated by
the following example [59]. In 2000, at a national meeting of the
Swedish Association of General Practice (SFAM), representing
Sweden’s family doctors, an advertising campaign for Effexor
(venlafaxine) won the category ‘‘worst advertisement of the year’’.
The campaign sought to launch Effexor as a treatment for
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, but according to the SFAM the
campaign was aimed at expanding markets for Effexor by
medicalizing the everyday anxieties of healthy individuals. Yet
no family doctor reported these advertisements to the IGM.
(Incidentally, a Swedish Medical Journal jury crowned the same
campaign ‘‘best advertisement of the year in the Swedish Medical
Journal’’ because of its appeal to doctors [60]. The prize –
awarded to Wyeth’s Swedish product line manager – was
a weekend for two in Berlin).
Related to this, health professionals and public authorities must
report potential breaches in a timely fashion. The need to improve
swiftness in reporting is supported by the finding that cases
initiated following voluntary complaints were associated with
significant lags, possibly reflecting major gaps between dates of
printing and reporting on a claim. When taken together, this
points to limitations in the voluntary complaints mechanisms and,
consequently, it emphasizes the need for active and efficient
monitoring of promotional material by expert bodies such as the
IGM to limit physician exposure to misleading medicines in-
formation.
Finally, we would suggest that measures be taken to further
enhance transparency and accountability in the self-regulatory
system. Specifically, we suggest that case reports not only specify
all claim(s) in breach of the code, but also indicate all publications
where these claims had been printed prior to the violation ruling.
This would facilitate investigations of lags in the system and help to
assess the impact of misleading promotion.
Admittedly, the present discussion has pointed to significant
shortcomings in the Swedish self-regulatory system. It is important
to keep in mind, however, that promotional regulatory regimes
may vary considerably among countries and therefore caution
must be exercised when generalizing results. In the United States,
for example, it is the Division of Drug Marketing and Advertising
within the FDA that regulates pharmaceutical advertising and
promotion [8], [56]. Many countries nonetheless rely on
pharmaceutical industry self-regulation [16], [18], [23–25]. In
light of past and present praise of the efficacy and transparency of
the Swedish system, there is little reason to believe that the
Swedish system is any more permissive than other self-regulatory
systems. However, international comparisons of the strengths and
weaknesses of existing promotion regulatory systems are needed to
substantiate this contention. We suggest it could be fruitful to
pattern such international comparisons on this study.
Criticism of pharmaceutical industry self-regulation is far from
new. In 1990, Herxheimer and Collier [17] reviwed 302 reports of
complaints considered by the Association of the British Pharma-
ceutical Industry code of practice committee. The high frequency
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of serious code breaches identified, in combination with ineffective
sanctions, led the authors to suggest that self-regulation mainly
serves industry rather than the public, a point that resonated with
the House of Commons Health Select Committee’s report on the
influence of the pharmaceutical industry 15 years later [23].
Another critical appraisal of self-regulation found that, as of 1997,
the Canadian self-regulatory system suffered from serious weak-
nesses with respect to five aspects considered important for code
enforcement: (1) mechanisms for recognizing violations; (2)
composition of monitoring committees; (3) sanctions for code
violations; (4) the quantity and quality of information in reports
issued about complaints and code violations, and (5) the
circulation these reports receive [18]. The Australian self-
regulatory system has come under scrutiny too, in that case for
alledged problems related to retrospective detection of code
breaches and low fines for violations, that is, similar to the
weaknesses outlined here [61–62].
However, it is unclear whether such criticism has resulted in
significantly stricter promotional regulatory regimes [63]. In most
countries, the state holds ultimate legal responsibility to ensure that
corporations adhere to existing marketing and pharmaceutical
regulation, as well as to ensure safeguarding of public health. If the
shortcomings uncovered by this study prove to be consistent across
self-regulatory settings, and if appropriate measures are not taken
to amend shortcomings, many countries might choose to re-
consider the current balance between self-regulation, and direct
legislative control with government oversight over medicines
promotion, in an effort to protect public health and state finances.
But as the reported failure of the underfunded FDA to ensure
reliable pharmaceutical advertisements work to remind us, it is
crucial that public regulatory bodies are adequately funded to
carry out their task [8], [56]. For if adequate funding cannot be
ensured, we risk substituting one problematic regulatory regime
for another.
Limitations
The main limitation of this study is its restriction to a specific
drug class in a single journal. In regard to drug class, it is possible
that the highly competitive nature of the antidepressant market
drove companies to particularly extravagant claims. Rivalry
between companies is also likely to increase motivation to
complain about misleading claims (e.g. comparative efficacy
claims) that are perceived to provide an advantage to competitors
– but is unlikely to generate complaints about misleading claims
that are mutually beneficial to all competitors (e.g. general efficacy
claims or claims pertaining to monoamine theories, as addressed
by this paper). Thus, future studies might appropriately address
a comparison of cases with and without inter-company competi-
tion.
Concerning single journal, it should be noted that although the
Swedish Medical Journal is the country’s principal medical
journal, there are a few other medical journals printed in Sweden.
It is reasonable to believe that advertisements in the Swedish
Medical Journal at least sometimes were simultaneously printed in
these journals. Consequently, the figures presented in this paper
regarding the number of misleading advertisements, lags in the
system and the low cost associated with misleading advertising,
should be considered underestimates. This fact, however, merely
serves to further strengthen the argument that pharmaceutical
industry self-regulation in Sweden has not been working satisfac-
torily.
Conclusions
The Swedish self-regulatory system of medicines promotion
largely failed to motivate industry into providing truthful in-
formation on antidepressants in medical journal advertisements.
Specifically, we demonstrate that this failure was associated with:
(1) lax oversight, (2) lags in the regulatory system, and (3) low fines
for violations. If current corporate regulatory regimes fail to deter
industry from providing unreliable information, we suggest that
many countries may want to reconsider the current balance
between self-regulation, and direct legislative control with
government oversight over medicines promotion, in order to
ensure rational drug prescribing practices, provided that sufficient
funding for public regulatory bodies is guaranteed.
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